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New Concepts in Global Wargaming
James J. Tn'tten
Kleber S. Masterson, Jr.
Today, when the call for defense reform is often made, when there is a
wide ranging debate on how to fight or deter war, and when the services and
the CINCs are working intensely at developing optimum plans for acquiring and
integrating new technologies into out force structure, gaming is undergoing a
resurgence at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Not only are
the traditional wargaming systems, such as that at the Naval War College,
undergoing major modernization and increased usage, but new concepts,
methodologies and systems for gaming are being developed and used to examine
issues not heretofore addressed. The complexities of the issues we face today
and their intractability to solution with conventional analytical tools, has
led to the development of high-level, fast-running alobal gaming systems
and new gaming methodologies which are helping military planners develop
powerful insights into future force balance, deterrence, and war fighting
issues. We now have enough experience with these recently developed concepts
to assess their usage and potential.
Among the things that are being rediscovered is that wa roaming can be
used simultaneously as an educational and an analytic process that can help us
to prepare better for the deterrence of war and to fight better if deterrence
fails. A war game is a simulation, a theoretical conflict, and of course, not
reality. But at its best, gaming can act as a bridge between artifice and
actuality in ways that are quite compelling and perhaps not initially
recognized. Wargaming can allow new theories and concepts to be tested and
can stimulate insightful and novel thinking about various issues. It can also
promote a common understanding of the problems and may even promote a
consensus on ways to meet those problems.
In some cases, traditional analytical methodologies have seemed to be
inadequate to the complexity of the task or to the almost unbounded degrees of
freedom of today's problems. This is not surprising. Multilateral defense
issues are more difficult, existing and potential technologies more complex,
and the threats more sophisticated. In widely differing theaters, military
commanders must be prepared to threaten to use or actually use a simultaneous
mix of nuclear, conventional and unconventional forces. Future military
operations will likely encompass increasingly sophisticated combined arms use
of sea, land, air and space assets to achieve strategic, operational and
tactical objectives.
Complexity is compounded by the different suggested strategies,
logistical difficulties, competing demands for resource allocation, varying
response times for the different types of forces and the very rapid tempo of
modern warfare. Traditional analysis techniques may founder in the face of
these complexities, but in many cases wargaming can help provide an answer.
Gamina allows players to address issues that might otherwise be out of
analytical reach with by allowing them to "experience" future conflict.
However, for wargaming to address these types of issues adequately -- so
that we are ready to deter war or alternately fight better -- we have to have
more sophisticated simulations and better gaming mechanisms, and it is on
these that the remainder of our discussion focuses.
Two major approaches have been followed to develop the needed
improvements. In one approach, highly aggregated global games have been
designed that, in a single architectural context, encompass land, sea, air and
space systems; unconventional, conventional, chemical and nuclear conflict;
logistics from industrial base through lift through material flow to the
fronts; and, global scale with a theater-level or sub-theater "zoom lens."
These games, initially designed *or and utilized as low-cost manual board
games, are now supported by PC-based computer models. New gaming
methodologies have been developed and proven with these systems, and they have
been utilized extensively by a variety of organizations for analysis and
education.
The second key new approach to wargaming has been the development of
gaming systems which make extensive use o f state-o f-the-art techniques in
artificial intelligence to support automated play of some or all of either
side in the game, as well as that of other parties. This aaming system will
allow a much wider ranae of "what- if" questions to be answered during game
play or subsequent analysis.
In both cases, games covering the conduct o^ one or morp global wars can
be conducted by teams ranging from a few to two dozen players on each side, in
as little a few to as much as twenty hours of gamer time. Further, these
games can be taken to the players instead of the players having to come to the
games. These new techniaues and techno! oaies are proving capable of enhancing
the benefits of gaming while rpducing some of its traditional limitations.
A key concept of new gaming systems as they have evolved is that the
players communicate in their own operational language and need have no
knowledge of gaming to play effectively. The game's models are so designed
that experienced controllers can easily translate everything that the players
want to do into model inputs and the results can be readily interpreted by the
controllers and explained to the players in operational terms. The
controllers ensure that a credible war is "fought" in all cases, responsive to
the explicit, and implicit direction of the players, and that all relevant,
physically achievable actions directed by the players are reflected in the
game calculus.
These new techniques and technologies stem from two basic assumptions
about gaming First, games should be used as a mechanism to examine issues;
therefore, they will focus more on the process than the outcome of an
individual campaign or war. In other words, why something happened is often
more important than what happened in the game. The gaming experience can be
used to flesh out what are otherwise paper concepts. For example, playing
alternative and identical wars in which only one key variable is changed might
allow players to focus on the impact of the land campaign in Central Europe
from swinging or not swinging theater forces.
Using a game as a source of stimulation, players can be asked to address
questions and issues of interest. A new technique that has proven to be very
powerful is to have players develop majority and minority views on key
questions - together with the rationales for their views - early in each game,
and then periodically during the game have them reexamine the auestions,
iteratively improving the responses based on events in the game, on
conversations with other players, and on their own reflection on the
questions.
A game thus can be an integrative mechanism between the viewpoints of a
wide variety of players and what has happened in a simulation. Gaming as such
a tool to explore issues and stimulate thought is an excellent mechanism that
can attract an analyst or policy decision maker who otherwise might not
have an opportunity or take the time to address issues and stimulate thought
is an excellent mechanism that can attract an analyst or policy decision maker
who otherwise might not have an opportunity or take the time to address issues
in Such an interactive, integrating fashion.
Our second basic assumption is that, while game can assist in exploring
questions of strategy, operational art, tactics, human behavior, etc , a
single game cannot objectively prove or disprove anything; hence it can be
less threatening than a paper or briefing. Players can report what they did
as a group in the game, in the context of the situation of that particular
game, without being vulnerable to personal criticism. This allows the
elements of the decision and of the decision-making process to be examined
objectively. Using the example from above, a game cannot "prove" that
swinging or not swinging out of area forces can make a strategic difference
(or not), but it can help players learn for themselves what factors bear most
heavily on any decisions to do or not to do this. Players will have their
assumptions challenged by events and by other players, and generally they take
something away with them after a game that leads to further thought and
substantive analysis.
Although we believe wargaming is not a decisive tool, it is one that can
encourage participants to broaden their perspectives and develop new insights
on issues. In putting teams together for these types of games, it has been
useful to strive for representation from a wide spectrum of groups which have
an interest in the issues being addressed. Further, another powerful
techniaue has been to conduct play on a not-for-attribution basis. By doing
so, one can stimulate thinking and expose players to a broader range of
perspectives on the issues being examined. Often in such an environment,
unconstrained and innovative thinking occurs. Further, the techniaue of
focusing player attention on coherent statements of majority and minority
views, and the rationale for them, helps ensure that good ideas are refined
and are not lost.
We find games are an educational mechanism for illuminating and
understanding concepts that are difficult to grasp in the abstract but become
clearer when players resolve complex related issues. A good example is the
asymmetry that Blue players observe when they see Red players approaching game
tasks in a logical top-down manner making the links obvious between doctrine,
strategy, operational art, and tactics. Games also allow the Blue player to
observe that although most Red players, and perhaps the Soviet Union, are
better at pre-war planning, they are not necessarily better at execution.
As noted above, games can be used to focus players on a series of
questions of interest to a sponsor within the context of particular war or
campaign. In essence, such games are an exercise in experimental
political-military research under structured conditions. Simple, rapid
calculus PC-based models can serve as a high level integrator of fast-moving,
broadly scoppd events and permit consideration of a wide variety of war
fighting, plannina and logistical issues. Without entering into the "black
box" of operational research, players can develop policy, accomplish
mobilization or contingency planning, and simulate joint or combined military
operations. New artificial intelligence concepts can parametrically explore
possible political-military outcomes at the global through theater levels and
further integrate the calculus of all forms of warfare.
The point of using artificial intelligence concepts is not to do away
with the human element, but to elucidate it better. Another advantage of
these systems is that they permit the entire play of the game to be automated,
thus achieving the ability to run rapidly hundreds of excursions for validity
testing, contingency, and sensitivity analysis. We have high hopes for using
such systems both to conduct games and to conduct in-depth analyses of
previous less-automated gaming efforts.
A major problem of ail wargaming i> tc represent accurately Soviet
behavior and an asymmetrical world view. Simply put, players must deal with
the radical differences in political objectives and military style that
competing nations ha>*e. This problem arose during the Vietnam era when the
lack of players who could simulate or represent the Morth Vietnamese resulted
in misleading game results.* We need to get our simulations to represent
better the asymmetries between perspectives and methods of warfare o f nations
so that we do not simply have BLUE players playing RED as BLUE would play.
Again, artificial intelligence concepts can allow the software to capture the
government's best view of the expected behavior of the USSR and then have this
model available for all users. These types of aames are only possible when
they fully integrate the basic aame objectives, well thought out scenarios,
models that are good enough and carefully selected players. There must be a
very close relationship between the game sponsor and the group charged with
the conduct of the game.
When this is done, games and simulations allow players to practice and
refine techniques to improve our ability to deal with the Soviet Union on
either specific issues like controlling escalation during a crises, or in
terms of our long-term competitive relationship. A very important objective
can be attained when we do this in a game: players can be forced to deal with
outputs (what they are trying to make happen) rather than only inputs or the
adjudication mechanism. Thus, a war termination aame may help players focus
on the identification of asymmetrical political goals of the two sides.
Through that process, they might better understand the long-term competitive
relationship between the superpowers and then be able to assess from a new
* General Bruce Palmer, Jr. The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in
Vietnam
,
(Lexington, KY; University of Kentucky Press, 1989), p. 29.
perspective the types of forces and arms control regimes that might better
contribute to the management of the superpower relationship. A game is not a
substitute for reality, but it can still serve as a useful mechanism that
forces players to consider what types of decisions have to be made, in what
order, and by whom so as to achieve a satisfactory resolution o f complicated
multilateral political-military issues.
One area which has been explored recently has been the use of "open,"
"closed," and hybrid games. In an "open" game, both sides are in the same
room and can debate their moves with each other before committing themselves.
In a "closed" game, they are separated and communicate only through the game
mechanisms. The objectives of the game will drive its conduct. For example,
if a game is to examine the employment of forces in a conventional land
campaign, it may be useful to conduct it as an "open" game in which both BLUE
and RED debate their options and make their moves together. This interactive
process gives small player teams many of the benefits of the staffing that
exists in the real world. Thus, if one side is considering an easily
countered action, the other team will point out the counter, and a more
robust series of moves usually results. Such a game is useful in determining
possible courses of action involving a particularly conml ex issue that has no
historical precedent and little depth in well-thought-out literature.
Conversely, other situations are much better suited to "closed" games,
particularly when perceptions each side has of the other appear to be much
more crucial to possible outcomes and results, or when complex concepts such
as preferential defense are being examined. A hybrid process which shifts
from closed to open gaming can sometime achieve the benefits of both forms of
gaming.
Flexibility must also be built into scenarios. The measure of a good
scenario is not how new or innovative it is, but its usefulness in getting
players to address the issues of interest. The starting point of a scenario
should be chosen so that the game can begin at the point where the issues to
be examined become important. In many cases, that is the crisis phase, but in
some games this may be well into the conflict or even (in unusual cases) after
a cease fire has already taken place. Further, it is sometimes useful to
allow major chanaes in scenario during the game itseit in order to enable
players to examine the issues in a way they consider most realistic or
powerful. For example, during the play of a game, Control might allow teams
to examine the impact of a shift of scenario from a minimal amount of initial
warning and mobilization to a case where both strategic and tactical warnina
are given, and the resulting changes in force Dosture on both sides. It takes
a flexible gaming system with a readily modified data base to make such
flexibility oossibl.e.
Another new concept in global wargaming if the extension of the time
scale of the game from the relatively short span of what are now called state
names to one or more decades in oath aames. The pormer examine a given set of
issues at a particular time with force structures and strategies that are set.
Path games, by contrast, examine a series of policy or force structure
decisions over a prolonged period -- say, ten or more years. Conflicts can be
gamed, either at the end of the game or along the paths, utilizing the forces
resulting from the decisions made during the path(s). Alternately, as a
pre-game layout prior to the path game itself, a state game can be conducted
to hiqhl ight the current perceived oroblem.
A key concern or gaming limitation is the tendency by some players to
"game the game." Trying to figure out what actions will produce some desired
result from the game models obviously works against the purpose of a game.
Although control can show players the details of models and let them control
inputs directly, an alternative approach is for control to act as interpreters
of their moves and reporter of results. An important role of Control, then,
is to ensure that game calculus reflects "reality" as well as humanly
possible, and that "gaming the game" is not rewarded.
In addition to the above role for Control, experience has shown that
games can be even more effective if Control creates a "no fault" type of game.
In such a game, Control takes both general and specific player orders on
strategy, operational art, and tactics, and then fills in all the details
necessary to cause RED and BLUE to fight well. In automated games, players
can focus on functions or geographic areas of interest which the gaming system
models the rest of the world. Game play benefits from having whatever aspects
the players are focusing on occur in the context of the full conflict.
The real point of using models is not to emulate reality, or to force
players to act out roles, so much as to serve as a device to stimulate
innovative thought, and by so doing, to educate players and sponsors.
Obviously, models do not predict actual outcomes, but their results must be
reasonable for such a gaming effort. A preferred method is to indicate the
range of possible outcomes for a given situation. Unfortunately, some people
tend to believe that the results produced by a game are real and that
something has been proven. They are not, and at best the results are only a
reasonable first-cut test of various ideas or concepts. However, certain
results (especially those that emerge over and over in similar games) should
be submitted to in-depth sensitivity analysis and validation.
Flexibility and interaction are two additional ingredients that can
further stimul ate pi ayers and sponsors. Control can encourage players to do
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anything that is physically reasonable during the period of the game years,
even to the point of "inventing" new weapon systems. The game can act as an
integrative mechanism to integrate otherwise incommensurate ideas into a
single calculus. At high levels of aggregation, this permits truly
interesting and innovative thinking to emerge. In addition, games can be
structured to prevent players from expecting that there will be a winner
declared at the end of the game. Winning is irrelevant to the type of games
described; the focus is issues.
Although we believe it is crucial for players to understand the game and
its objectives prior to the start, no previous gaming experience is reauired
for such seminar games. By not using role playing, team leaders instead draw
on the strengths of the individuals on their teams by working as a "committee
of the whole." Thus, a player familiar, say only with naval forces, does not
have to role play a unified commander. What often results in a synergistic
combination of player strengths and a team that is stronger than the sum of
its parts.
If players do not play as official representatives of their
organizations, but as individuals selected for their expertise and knowledge
who are all allowed to present majority and minority views in insightful
debate over the issues, it appears that they are more likely to take something
back with them for further study and analysis. The fact that ttie "lessons
learned" from a simulation can be remembered long after lectures or readings
on the same subject is both on opportunity and a drawback that must be
carefully accounted for by the Control team.
The techniques discussed above have been used to examine a wide variety
of global conflict situations in ways not normally gamed - namely, in a
combined arms approach that intergrates all forces, including allied forces,
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and both "tactical" and "strategic" forces, and that extends through all
levels of confl ict.
From the experiences of these types of games, we find that new
observations on the nature of war are as significant an outcome as lessons
about any specific individual campaign. For example, during a game, players
can observe the relationships between nuclear and non-nuclear warfare that
normally might not be perceived. Similarly, the use of conventional forces
for political crisis response might be assessed in the light of the balance of
nuclear forces more easily in a gaming environment.
Seminar games of this type can lead the Control team and experts who
analyze the broader implications of game play to better prepare threat and net
assessments by including dynamic measures, the complex interrelationship of
nuclear and non-nuclear forces, and time as a variable. This in turn
generates requirements for more robust calculations and obligates analysts to
find easily understood measures that correctly describe the balance, e.g., who
is likely to achieve their objectives and at what cost? Such an approach
obviously involves a major shift in thinking to use outputs rather than inputs
for the appropriate measure of effectiveness.
In general, we in the West must get better in thinking "RED" and
understanding the Soviet use of terms, measures of effectiveness, and
assessment of the correlation of forces. Gaming, as described herein, is an
excellent methodology for having BLUE-oriented players come face to face with
an opponent whose orientation and method of conducting warfare is not the same
as his.
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Games are also a good methodology for testing arms control strategies and
force procurement options. They allow players to create alternative futures
to see what combination might influence an opponent so that he will commit
resources in a manner that is more satisfactory and less destabilizing. *
Path games are specifically designed to explore such possibilities.
Gaming and simulation also offer a good vehicle to explore regional
warfare and the use of military force for crisis response as it relates to
the central question of superpower deterrence. The impact of the overall
correlation of forces and means (and especially the strategic nuclear balance)
on the use of non-nuclear forces for contingencies may be examined in such
politico-military simulation. The ability to dominate the escalation ladder
(vertically, horizontally, or in time) or lack of this ability can be a major
area for examination in a game. War termination or even extended nuclear
operations are difficult issues for most U.S. players to deal with. Games are
a good device to allow humans to focus their attention on such issues.
The validity of wargaming extends far beyond the realm of defense;
lawyers recognized long ago their value in moot courts; international
relations educators often use U.N. simulations; and management training often
includes gaming of industry competition and negotiation. Wargaming is a
high-powered tool that demands careful analysis and its inevitable
concentration on outputs. Gamers are forced to follow through their
brainstorming and see the results. This is a great benefit because it
reinforces the initial steps in the decision-making process. However, in
reality there is also the danger of over- selling the results of a game; it
* Although the authors recognize that stability, per se, is not the preferred
political goal.
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is a mistake remarkably parallel to over-selling the lessons of history.
Games, like events in history, may be one time events, and participants
should not be lulled into thinking that they are prepared for all
contingencies. Nevertheless, gaming also has many of the advantages of
history, with its richness of content; as such, gaming can yield insights that
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